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FROM DEVELOPMENTAL REGIONALISM TO 
DEVELOPMENTAL INTERREGIONALISM? 
 







With the signing of the Cotonou Agreement, the European Union’s development 
approach to the ACP states underwent a profound change. The Union has adopted a 
regionalist approach to development, disaggregating this larger grouping into six 
smaller regions. This approach, however, is nested within a wider network of region-
to-region dialogue structures in which the EU is engaged. The result is both the 
appearance of certain synergies between developmental regionalism and interregional 
dialogue structures, but also, as is typical of EU interregional dialogues, the leaking of 
elements of interregionalism into the development framework that are inappropriate 
for the current level of integration of the ACP sub-groups. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore this concept of developmental 
regionalism, looking at its history, and its perceived benefits today. Discussion 
therefore begins with an investigation of the historic application of regionalism to 
development. Consideration is given to the linking of ‘old’ regionalism to 
Structuralist and Dependency views of the international economy and the causes of 
underdevelopment, and of the ‘new’ regionalism’s ties to the Neoliberal counter-
revolution in development thinking. The paper then moves on to exploring some of 
the perceived benefits, both economic and non-economic, for developing countries of 
the new developmental regionalism. Finally, the paper considers the manner in which 
developmental regionalism is being applied by the EU. Specifically, it is concerned 
with the interregional context of the new developmental regionalism. In other words, 
it is interested in the way in which the EU approach firmly entrenches developmental 
regionalism within the broader architecture of global governance, and the synergies 
between developmental regionalism and interregionalism – can we conceive a   3
‘developmental interregionalism’? In this respect, this paper constitutes a first 
tentative attempt to explore a formal role for interregionalism in development. 
 
REGIONALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: FROM WITHDRAWAL TO 
INTEGRATION 
Regionalism is not a new phenomenon. It is a characteristic, in varying forms, of the 
international system of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Nor is the application 
of regionalism to development a new idea. What can be seen, however, is a 
continuing evolution of the notion of developmental regionalism, adapting as a 
response to changes in the economic and political context in which states operate. 
  As Fawcett (1995, p.11) acknowledges, if formal organisation at the regional 
level is to be taken as the indicator for the emergence of regionalism, it is difficult to 
place its origins much before 1945. Theoretical convention refers to two waves of 
regionalism in the post-World War II period, identifying the ‘old regionalism’ of the 
1950s and 1960s, and the ‘new regionalism’ that has increasingly emerged since the 
mid-1980s.
1 From a developmental perspective, these two forms display significant 
differences, differences firmly entrenched in the dominant developmental discourses 
in which they emerged. 
 
Old Regionalism and Development 
As far as regional approaches to development are concerned, it has always been the 
case that development has in some way been linked with economic growth, with the 
two in many instances being treated as synonymous. In the decades after the Second 
                                                 
1 It must be acknowledged, however, that some theorists (e.g. Sideri, 2000) posit three waves of 
regionalism, tracing the process as far back as the 1930s. The first wave identified under such a 
chronology is the regionalisation that occurred within defined imperialist blocs dominated by 
hegemonial powers such as Germany (in Central and Eastern Europe), Japan (the Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere), the United Kingdom (the Commonwealth) and the United States (the dollar 
bloc). (A detailed discussion of the regionalisation of the inter-war years may be found in Eichengreen 
and Frankel, 1995).  
The process evident in the 1930s may, however, be distinguished from the post-World War II 
integration arrangements, justifying its exclusion from the following analysis. In contrast to the post-
1945 situation with regionalism premised upon the sovereign equality of states, inter-war initiatives 
were hegemonially driven. As Eichengreen and Frankel (1995, p.97) state, “[o]nce Germany reasserted 
itself in foreign affairs, it sought to build a self-contained regional bloc composed of the Reich and the 
countries to its east in order to minimize dependence on potential enemies and to achieve geopolitical 
aims. This encouraged France and Britain to pursue bloc-oriented initiatives of their own”. The result 
was a system defined by competitive regions designed to achieve the independence and self-reliance of 
the hegemonial master, rather than the collective development of all bloc members.   4
World War, this involved an emphasis on ‘modernisation’, essentially defined as 
industrialisation, made possible by the foreign exchange generated through 
commodity exports.
2 Industrial modernisation, it was argued, was essential to 
increasing productivity and therefore aggregate welfare. The unique difficulties of 
developing states in achieving this, however, were increasingly highlighted by so-
called ‘two-gap models’, which pointed to the low propensity to save and the 
inelasticity of earnings on commodity exports in LDCs. 
Development discourse in the 1950s and 1960s was further complicated by the 
rise of the Latin American structuralists. The structuralist approach, later to become 
the dependency critique of development theory, modelled an international economic 
order polarised between an industrialised and developed core and an underdeveloped 
periphery.
3 Dependency theorists argued that the international economic system was 
characterised by unequal exchange, and that consequently sustained growth through 
exports was an impossibility. Countries of the periphery would find themselves 
trapped in a position of permanent underdevelopment as suppliers of inexpensive raw 
materials to the developed core.
4 In its most extreme formulation, this led some 
dependency theorists to the conclusion that the best path for developing countries was 
to de-link from the international economy. More generally, however, it led to the 
advocation of policies of self-reliance.
5 
The policy implication of this development discourse was emphasis on an 
activist state, demanded both by the requirements of domestic resource mobilisation 
and by the need to implement interventionist and protectionist policies to overcome 
the structural impediments to growth faced by LDCs in the global economy (Bowles, 
2000, p.435). Free trade was rejected as it led to the establishment of a more or less 
fixed core-periphery structure. When commodity prices bottomed-out in the 1970s, 
the prospects for development among these countries seemed dim indeed. 
Development theory, therefore, was premised on finding solutions to the structural 
impediments to growth imposed on LDCs by the international capitalist system. 
Typical solutions centred on the transfer of resources through Official Development 
                                                 
2 See, for example, the works of theorists such as Lewis (1954) and Rostow (1960). 
3 The model was later further nuanced through the introduction of a semi-periphery, roughly 
corresponding to the Communist second world. 
4 See Baran (1957) and Frank (1966, 1967, 1969) for a fuller understanding of the dependency 
approach. 
5 This approach was favoured by many post-independence leaders in the developing world, including 
inter alia Jawaharlal Nehru in India, and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana.   5
Assistance (ODA) as a means for remedying foreign exchange deficits, and on the 
stabilisation of commodity prices through the creation of artificial regimes designed 
to stabilise export earnings.
6 Import-Substituting Industrialisation (ISI) became the 
policy of choice for many developing countries. 
South-South regional initiatives emerged as a natural complement to these 
protectionist development strategies. Regionalism itself, while having been 
recognised as early as the Preliminary UN Charter negotiated at Dumbarton Oaks in 
1944 (Fawcett, 1995, p.12), was not launched onto the international agenda until the 
1950s with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). On the 
heels of this European initiative, a distinctly Third World approach to regionalism 
emerged, contextualised within the development discourse outlined above. While 
there was some division among Third World writers on the utility of regionalism for 
development,
7 a core group in favour of a regionalist approach emerged, motivated by 
the economic rationale of Cooper and Massell (1965a, 1965b), Johnson (1965) and 
Bhagwati (1968). Accepting industrial modernisation as a “legitimate policy goal” 
(Cooper and Massell, 1965b, p.462) in seeking development, the Cooper and Massell-
Johnson-Bhagwati model suggested that in the context of an ISI policy, the structural 
impediment of small markets and the high costs of industrialisation could be 
overcome by developing countries by exploiting the economies of scale available as a 
result of regional integration through, for example, withdrawing behind common 
external tariff barriers, market- and industry-sharing agreements etc. In addition, as 
Ghatak (2003, p.214) observes, political incentives for the establishment of regional 
blocs were foreseen: “Regional co-ordination among LDCs is supposed to provide 
them with greater bargaining power in their economic and political relationships with 
DCs”. For these reasons, regionalism was seen by Third World structuralists as a tool 
in the struggle to end the exploitative and dependent relationship between LDCs and 
the industrialised North. 
                                                 
6 In the latter respect, the European Union (then European Economic Community, EEC) led the charge, 
introducing STABEX (Stabilisation of Export Earnings) in 1975 to combat the vulnerability of 
developing countries to commodity price fluctuations. It constituted, in effect, “an insurance policy for 
the ACP” (Holland, 2002, p.36), with the EU guaranteeing a minimum earnings threshold and 
providing compensation for any losses incurred by lower prices or loss of production. 
7 See Archer (1992, pp.118-124) for an overview of Third World writing on regionalism in this period.   6
Despite the foundation of a number of political and economic organisations 
dominated by developing countries,
8 the solidarity demanded by structuralist theorists 
failed to materialise (Fawcett, 1995, p.15). Bhagwati (1993, p.28) points to the 
tendency of LDCs launching such initiatives to use bureaucratic negotiation rather 
than trade liberalisation (and hence prices) in determining industry allocations, and to 
tie trade to the resulting allocation, thus “putting the cart before the horse and killing 
the forward motion”, as being the key factor behind the collapse of the regionalising 
imperative. To this, however, may be added the decline in ISI to which 
developmentally-focused regionalism had been tied, a result of the gross 
inefficiencies produced by sheltering industries from competition. The net result was 
that, by the end of the 1960s, regionalism in all but the original European Community 
and in the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) had stagnated or collapsed. Succinctly 
summarised by de Melo et al. (1992, p.3), regional integration among developing 
countries in the 1960s “was a failure, both in terms of implementation, and in terms of 
the stated objectives of accelerating the pace of industrialization by raising intra-
regional trade”. 
 
New Regionalism and Development 
Regionalism re-emerged in the 1980s, again the result of European activity, but 
contextualised within a profoundly altered development paradigm. The new 
development era was ushered in by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, 
the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, the debt crisis and the emergence and adoption by 
certain developed country governments of the neoliberal economic discourse during 
the 1980s, not to mention the rise of multinational corporations (MNCs), the end of 
the bipolar conflict and, of course, globalisation with its attendant linkages and 
exchanges transcending the regulatory power of individual states. 
  The rise of neoliberalism, in particular, led to challenges to the role of an 
activist and protectionist state, a process, as Bowles (2000) acknowledges, reinforced 
by the increasing awareness of the differential development outcomes achieved by 
protectionist and liberalising LDCs. The neoliberal counter-revolution in development 
                                                 
8 Including inter alia the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, the Central American Common 
Market (CACM) and the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) in 1960, the Central African 
Customs and Economic Union (CACEU/UDEAC) in 1964, and the Caribbean Free Trade Area 
(CARIFTA) in 1968. See Pazos (1973) and de Melo et al. (1992) for detail on these early regional 
arrangements.   7
economics (Toye, 1987), therefore, called into question the role of state-led 
development and of ISI, arguing that the result was inefficient production, 
discouragement of export-earning and of traditional wealth-creating activities (Kiely, 
1998, p.31). The neoliberal solution to the underdevelopment that protectionism and 
ISI perpetuated was liberalisation, including particularly the liberalisation of 
international trade, currency devaluation and the rolling back of the state.
9 By 1990 
this prescription had been given a name – the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson, 
1990). 
The first application of the new counter-revolutionary development discourse 
came with the creation by the major IFIs of Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs) to address the problem of the debt crisis through policy-based lending. 
Designed to slash government expenditure, reduce state intervention and promote 
deregulation and trade, SAPs were made a prerequisite for economic aid to 
developing countries. By the end of the 1990s, however, SAPs had proved 
controversial, and were being credited with high and rising inequalities in the 
developing world. In response, the IFIs embarked on a rebranding of development 
policy, and in 1999 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) were born.  
By the first years of the twenty-first century, the notion that development is 
about poverty reduction had become the working assumption of development actors,
10 
an assumption that enabled a neat dovetail with the dominant neoliberal economics. 
By reducing development to poverty reduction, neoliberal development literature 
posits a solution involving promoting economic growth through full integration into 
the liberalised global economic system.
11  
Further, what has become almost universally accepted, despite frequent 
argument as to the deleterious effects of free markets, is that this economic growth 
(and therefore poverty reduction) is best achieved through “universal, open, rules-
based, predictable and non-discriminatory” international trade (NZAID, 2003, p.5). 
                                                 
9 Indicative of this trend was the 1984 report of US President Reagan’s ‘Task Force on International 
Private Enterprise’ (TFIPE, 1984), which urged a focus on the economic rather than the social side of 
development, arguing that this would produce the resources necessary for later social programmes. 
Achieving economic development was understood by the Task Force as involving promoting “the role 
of private enterprise, free markets and competition” (p.30). 
10 This has been expressed by, for example, the European Union, World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund, OECD, DFID, the ‘Make Poverty History’ campaign, to name but a few. 
11 Notes the World Bank (2001, pp.46-47), “the stark differences in poverty outcomes between rich and 
poor countries point to the central role of economic development in poverty reduction”. The UNDP 
(2003, p.67), too, has trumpeted the role of economic growth in poverty reduction.   8
“Trade”, stated the European Commission (2000, p.7) in its 2000 Communication on 
EC development policy, “is the most efficient means to generate resources necessary 





15 and was a key assertion in the report of the 
Commission for Africa.
16 
When the end of history arrived in the 1990s, it signalled a change in approach 
for Northern development actors, who quickly came to accept the assertion that the 
historical alternatives to liberal democracy and free market capitalism had been 
discredited. As far as development is concerned, a new modernisation appears to have 
emerged, where the end point is precisely liberal democracy allied with free market 
economics. Given the emphasis on globalisation and trade liberalisation, the 
differential development of some states has increasingly been explained not as a 
failure of neoliberal economics, but rather of domestic policy. Distorting state 
interventions were often highlighted, the IMF (1994, p.54), for example, asserting that 
“lack of economic stability, inadequate and distorted financial markets, unproductive 
state intrusion, and inward-looking trade policies have all acted to restrain growth in 
many cases”. In other words, the structural impediments to development inherent 
within the global economy that had previously been highlighted by development 
theorists have been replaced in explanations of underdevelopment by reference to 
poor governance 
In the context of this new development paradigm, the relaunching of European 
integration with the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 (incorporating 
                                                 
12 The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID, 2000, p.17), for example, states: 
“Everywhere it is clear that openness is a necessary – though not sufficient – condition for national 
prosperity. No developed country is closed. The initially poor countries that have been most successful 
in catching up in recent decades – the newly industrialising east Asian countries and China – seized the 
opportunity offered by more open world markets to build strong export sectors and to attract inward 
investment”. 
13 Alongside the EU, the African Union (AU), for example, asserted in a Declaration of 5
th July 2005 
that the poverty reduction target and other Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) would only be 
achieved through inter alia the establishment of “a fair and equitable trading system and… facilitat[ion 
of] Africa’s access to their [Developed Countries’] markets” (AU, 2005, Decl.1, s.8). 
14 Oxfam (2002, p.47), for example, asserts that the “financial transfers from development assistance 
are dwarfed by the potential benefits that would result if developing countries increased their share of 
world exports”. 
15 States the World Bank (2001, p.8): “All countries that have had major reductions in income poverty 
have made use of international trade”. 
16 The Commission’s report states that “[t]rade has been a key driver of growth over the past 50 years” 
and that “Africa will fail to achieve sustainable growth and poverty reduction, and fail to meet the 
Millennium Development Goals, unless it increases its diminishing share of world trade” (Commission 
for Africa, 2005, p.255).   9
as it did plans to complete a Single European Market (SEM) by 1992), constituted the 
seminal moment for new regionalism. The revitalisation of European integration was 
closely tied to the fundamental changes being experienced by the international 
system. Intrinsic to this was a de-territorialisation of economics such that states, in 
order to avoid marginalisation, band together to create a policy community with 
greater weight in the international system. The new development paradigm and the 
new regionalism, therefore, stemming from the same basic motive forces, have 
become inextricably linked. 
As Fawcett (1995, p.23) acknowledges, “there are few regions of the world 
where the apparently spectacular progress of the European Community towards 
economic and political union has failed to evince a response”. NAFTA and APEC 
owe much of their impetus to the existence of European regionalism, constituting in 
part a response to a feared ‘fortress Europe’. This fear of a fortress Europe made itself 
felt in the developing world too, with many ACP leaders certain that the Single 
Market process would “involve restrictions on imports into Europe as well as 
blocking ready access to industrial technology” (Aluko, 1991, p.37). Allied to this 
was a belief that European economic success in the new liberalised and globalised 
economy could be credited to its integrative solution, a solution that could be adopted 
elsewhere in the world.
17 Thus was seen the launch of Third World schemes premised 
on the Common Market ideal, including, for example, single market initiatives by the 
Arab Maghreb Union, the Andean Pact, MERCOSUR and CARICOM. In short, both 
developing states and development actors have come to view regionalism as a means 
for overcoming the negative effects on LDCs of integration into the global economy, 
as well as of promoting the liberalising process, through expanding markets, attracting 
foreign direct investment (FDI), allowing a step-by-step process to liberalisation etc. 
It is, in other words, a building block rather than a stumbling block in the emergence 
of a global economic system, a stark contrast to the old regionalism.  
The upshot of these changes which have occurred since the 1980s is that 
regionalism has become truly a ‘model for development’. The new regionalism 
                                                 
17 In 1988, for example, Olesegun Obasanjo (1988, p.21) argued that African states will only meet the 
challenges posed by the SEM and the broader global economy through some form of confederation, 
while Julius Nyerere, at the 1989 Belgrade Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, asserted that the 
only path to development for the south lay in “national and collective self-reliance” (quoted in Aluko, 
1991, p.37). By 1990, Obasanjo was criticising the “ridiculously large number of often economically 
unviable states” in Africa, to which the proposed solution was “a European-type integration to pool 
capacities” (ibid.).   10
implies openness to global markets and to the process of globalisation. As such, it is 
intrinsically linked to the new development discourse outline above. The adoption of 
regionalism, therefore, has come to mean the pursuit of economic growth through 
interaction with global markets, which, it is argued, will deliver the poverty reduction 
now seemingly seen by major actors as synonymous with development. Market 
liberalisation is no longer a policy choice of regional groupings, it is implied by 
regionalism. Follow the regionalist model, it is argued, and all will be delivered. In 
other words, regionalism is increasingly seen as the ‘killer application’ for economic 
growth-led development. 
 
Developmental Regionalism in EU Policy 
While developmental regionalism has become popular among a number of 
development actors, none have pursued it with more fervour than has the European 
Union. Indeed, the EU’s development policy is now largely based on supporting the 
creation of regional organisations among developing countries. In part this may be 
attributable to a narcissistic desire to see its own form mirrored in the world around it. 
Mostly, however, it stems from a strong belief in the ability of a form of organisation 
that has done much to spread peace and prosperity across the European continent to 
do the same elsewhere in the world. 
As far back as 1992, the Council of the European Union had raised 
integrationist arrangements as a policy goal, in its regulation on cooperation with Asia 
and Latin America explicitly asserting that “[r]egional cooperation between 
developing countries shall be considered a priority area for financial and technical 
assistance” (Council of the European Union, 1992, Art.5). By late 1995, with the 
establishment of its Institutional Development Programme for the ASEAN Secretariat 
(IDPAS), the Union’s support for regionalism among its partners had become 
proactive.
18 
  In its 1996 Green Paper on cooperation with the ACP in the twenty-first 
century (European Commission, 1996), it became clear just how closely initiatives for 
regional integration were to be tied to EU development policy. Asserting that 
                                                 
18 With the goal of building the ASEAN Secretariat as a central institution modelled to some extent on 
the European Commission, IDPAS constituted an overt attempt to affect ASEAN’s institutional 
structure to achieve further integration and development. IDPAS was succeeded in 2001 by the 
ASEAN Programme for Regional Integration Support (APRIS), designed to enhance the ASEAN 
Secretariat’s capacity for fostering integrative activities.   11
development must involve the developing countries’ “smooth and gradual integration 
into the world economy” (p.3), the Green Paper went on to state that the EU should 
“promote actively, and provide the conditions for facilitating the success of regional 
integration processes among ACP partners”. The Green Paper was to form the basis of 
what was to become the post-Lomé EU-ACP Partnership Agreement (Cotonou 
Agreement) of 2000. The Paper, appropriately given the structure of the new 
regionalism, was a mirror of IMF and World Bank thinking on development, 
highlighting clearly a transition in EU development policy away from that of 
innovator that was characteristic of the Lomé period, to that of committed disciple of 
the IFI approach. Indeed, Grynberg (1997), then trade economist of the Pacific Islands 
Forum Secretariat, launched a blistering attack, asserting that the proposals “when 
stripped of their diplomatic pleasantries, are in effect a recitation of IMF/World Bank 
structural adjustment policies with a politically correct veneer of concern for human 
rights, the environment and gender issues”. 
Importantly, and in line with above discussion on regionalism as an alternative 
to multilateralism, the Cotonou Agreement was signed in the wake of the collapsed 
1999 Seattle WTO Ministerial, and made provision for reciprocal free trade 
agreements that went beyond what the Union could possibly secure at the WTO. The 
stated central objectives of the Cotonou Agreement are “poverty reduction and 
ultimately its eradication; sustainable development; and progressive integration of the 
ACP countries into the world economy” (Art.19), the general approach for achieving 
which was to be WTO consistent regional integration among sub-groups of ACP 
states (Arts.28-30) fostered through a framework of EPAs. 
 
THE BENEFITS OF DEVELOPMENTAL REGIONALISM 
Many of the perceived developmental benefits of regionalism have become clear 
through the above discussion. What the following section does is to elaborate on a 
couple of key benefits most often highlighted by theorists, and which have found 
reflection in EU policy documents. This is clearly a far from exhaustive treatment, but 
nevertheless one that deals with many of the elements seen as bearing most upon 
development. 
   12
Economic Benefits of Regionalism 
Given the emphasis in the new development discourse on economic growth through 
integration into the global economy, it is unsurprising that the majority of potential 
benefits for development attributed to RIAs are economic.
19 A number of benefits of 
regionalism have been highlighted by theorists in relation to the new development 
discourse. While these are many and varied, it is market size that is most often 
attributed with delivering the benefits of development.  
  Arguments relating to market size are essentially reducible to the proposition 
that regional integration allows the “largely unmitigated beneficial effect” (Fernández 
and Portes, 1998, p.201) of the creation of larger markets through reducing internal 
barriers to trade, allowing advantage to be taken of economies of scale in the 
production of goods and services, and increased potential for investment. This is a 
response to the increasing recognition that the constraints imposed by globalisation 
and market liberalisation affect small and medium states to a greater extent than large 
states. Indeed, in Casella’s (1996, p.412) study of large and small countries in 
regional trade blocs, it was determined that “[s]mall country firms will see a decline 
in their relative cost disadvantage and will be the main beneficiaries of the 
enlargement of the trade bloc”. Fernández (1997, p.9) mirrors this position, drawing 
from this the conclusion that “[s]ince small countries will benefit more than larger 
countries – because they are starting at a lower base – from economies of scale and 
increased competition, we would expect to see them attach a higher priority to joining 
a RTA”. 
That economic expansion occurs as a result of such regionalising initiatives 
has often been contentious, though in a recent paper exploring the growth effects of 
integration, Berthelon (2004) concludes that there is strong evidence that expanding 
domestic markets through regional integration does indeed produce economic growth. 
What seems generally to be agreed is that economic growth and trade creation will 
occur where regional economic liberalisation takes place in the context of, rather than 
instead of, multilateral liberalisation.
20 
                                                 
19 This link between regionalism and the economic aspects of development is recognised by Sunkel 
(2000, p.67), who notes that “[t]he assumption seems to be that neoliberal economic reforms in each 
country – liberalization, deregulation, privatization, a diminishing role of the state and an open 
economy – plus initiatives like NAFTA, Mercosur and bilateral and multilateral free-trade agreements, 
will bring about economic and social development”. 
20 See, for example, discussion in de Melo and Panagariya (1993).   13
  Further to trade creation, enlarged markets are seen to be a key factor in 
attracting FDI. As the amount of concessional lending to developing countries has 
fallen in recent years, the importance of FDI to economic growth and therefore 
development has increased. Indeed, the need to attract investment is increasingly cited 
as a factor providing important impetus to regional economic integration,
21 with 
considerable evidence now pointing to the success of regionalism in this respect 
(World Bank, 2005b, p.37). The result, stated simply by Lederman et al. (2003, 
p.128), is that “joining a trade block leads to higher FDI inflows”.
22 
 
Non-Economic Benefits of Regionalism 
With the emphasis on regionalism as a path to poverty reduction, non-economic 
benefits such as, for example, securitisation and the creation of collective identities, 
and the emergence of some kind of collective bargaining capacity, have been largely 
ignored.
23 
  Securitisation has featured comparatively little in the work of theorists of 
developmental regionalism, a surprising situation given the ever closer linkages being 
drawn between stability and development, and indeed between conflict and 
underdevelopment. Nevertheless, occasional throwaway statements may be found, 
such as that of Cosbey et al. (2004, p.24) that “FTAs may also be concluded in an 
effort to stabilize potentially antagonistic relations”. This is not to say, however, that 
the link between regionalism and stability has not been drawn by theorists of other 
fields, though empirical studies remain sparse. Indeed, as far back as 1889 Wilfred 
Pareto (quoted in Machlup, 1977, p.143) argued that “customs unions and other 
systems of closer commercial relations [could serve] as means to the improvement of 
political relations and the maintenance of peace”. In recent years, a burgeoning 
literature has grown around the concept of enhanced flows through preferential 
trading arrangements leading to reductions in political conflict between member 
states, and the concept has found its way, albeit with no real analysis, into the World 
Bank’s report on Global Economic Prospects, with the acknowledgement that “[t]he 
                                                 
21 See, for example, Balasubramanyam and Greenaway (1993), Blomström and Kokko (1997) and 
Fernández (1997). 
22 For an overview of empirical research on regional integration and foreign direct investment, see 
Blomström and Kokko (1997). 
23 In referring to non-economic benefits, it is not being asserted that these factors bear no relation to the 
economic sphere. Rather, it is simply to acknowledge that their focus is not specifically economic or 
trade related.   14
tentative conclusion of existing studies is that RTAs that expand trade flows appear to 
have a substantial dampening impact on conflict” (World Bank, 2005a, p.36).  
The most comprehensive treatment of this process is provided by Mansfield 
and Pevehouse (2000), though, perhaps appropriately given the economic focus of 
developmental regionalism, this centers on an economic argument for security 
promotion. Essentially reducible to a notion of rational self-interest, this argument 
posits that states involved in economic regionalism
24 will not be willing to put the 
economic benefits, or even simply anticipated future benefits, of a PTA at risk by 
engaging in confrontational behaviour.
25 The conclusion of Mansfield and 
Pevehouse’s study is that as intraregional trade flows increase, so the chance of 
conflict falls. This is not an uncontested position. Powers (2003), for example, points 
out that even trade-producing RTAs may promote conflict where the gains are 
asymmetrically distributed, a situation that may particularly occur in regional 
arrangements involving states with stark divergences in size or level of 
development.
26 Either way, the reduction of the argument to one on the level of intra-
regional trade is an impoverished view of the impact of regionalism on securitisation, 
something that will be elaborated in more detail later in this piece. 
The second non-economic benefit to be considered here, closely linked to the 
economic benefit of increased market size, is that of interest aggregation and 
collective bargaining through what is effectively coalition formation at the regional 
level. This aspect of regionalism has come to be seen as an important element in 
global governance, most recently having occupied a central place in the work of 
theorists of interregionalism.
27 Interregionalists, drawing on the broad school of 
institutionalism, highlight the cooperative agenda setting role of RIAs, arguing that 
smaller numbers and a greater sense of common interest characteristic of regional 
organisations lead to the possibility of establishing combined negotiating agendas for 
expression in extra-regional, and particularly global multilateral, negotiations. This, 
                                                 
24 Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) refer specifically to PTAs. 
25 As an adjunct to this, the argument is made that PTAs sometimes create a forum for bargaining and 
negotiation that can help to alleviate any tensions. 
26 This idea is not a new one. The idea that gains from trade are not evenly distributed and therefore 
affect inter-state power relations may be seen in the work of Baldwin (1980), Hirschman (1945), and 
Keohane and Nye (1977). The additional recognition that changes in inter-state power equations are a 
source of military conflict may be found in the writing of Gilpin (1981), Levy (1989), and 
Mearsheimer (1990). 
27 See, for example, Doidge (2004b), Hänggi (1999), and Rüland (2000, 2001).   15
argue developmental regionalists,
28 is a necessary step for developing states wishing 
to have their voices heard in the global system for, in the globalised economy, a 
country’s negotiating power is strongly defined by market size (Oman, 1994, p.29). 
With these obvious asymmetries in the structures of global governance in mind, 
Hettne (2000, p.61) asserts that “[c]ollective bargaining at the level of the region 
could improve the economic position of marginalised countries in the world system, 
or protect the structural position and market access of new successful exporters”. 
It is not just to the advantage of developing countries, however, to pursue 
gains in negotiating power. Developed actors hope to be able to use these newly 
created/strengthened RIAs as a source of support for their own positions in global 
multilateral negotiations, with such dialogues effectively serving as a clearing-house 
for achieving agreement prior to negotiations in multilateral fora.
29 
Coalitions are generally established around a collective interest or viewpoint 
which the participant states wish to see expressed, or more negatively in opposition to 
another interest or viewpoint. They are seen as being better able to represent the 
interests of their constituent states than would be the case if said states were acting 
alone. Comments Touval (1989, p.161), “[t]he implicit threat to others that if they do 
not accept the terms proposed, their relationship with all the members of the coalition 
will suffer is more impressive than a similar threat made by a single state”.
30 In 
addition to the standard threat and counter-threat game, coalitions have shown 
themselves to be effective brokers in the face of great power antagonism, creating 
what Kahler (1992, p.706) refers to as “a focal point for negotiating equilibrium”.
31 
Though the assumption of development actors seems to be that such 
cooperation will occur almost by default when states regionalise, effective collective 
bargaining is not a simple process. Indeed, coalitions may also hinder agreement. 
                                                 
28 See, for example, Birdsall and Rojas-Suarez (2004), Cosbey et al. (2004), de Melo and Panagariya 
(1992), Hettne (2000), and Sideri (2000). 
29 Indeed, theorists of interregionalism count this as one of the five key functions of such dialogues 
(Doidge, 2004b; Rüland, 2001). This is discussed in more detail below. 
30 Touval (1989, p.161) goes on to state that “[t]hreats to break off negotiations without reaching an 
agreement may also be more effective, for states will be perceived by their opponents as being better 
able to withstand the consequences of no agreement if they are members of a coalition. 
31 Higgott and Cooper’s (1990) exploration of the role of the Cairns Group of agricultural nations in 
achieving a consensus at the 1986 Punte del Este GATT meeting for a new round of trade negotiations, 
and in the conduct of the subsequent Uruguay Round, recognises just such a function. Arguing that the 
negotiating process cannot be understood simply in terms of the power of the US and the then EC as 
the two dominant actors, they assert that agenda setting and negotiating was greatly facilitated by the 
Cairns Group’s activities as bridge builder and consensus seeker between the major actors themselves   16
Andriamananjara and Schiff (1998, pp.4-5), for example, highlight this problem, 
noting that while “the member countries save on the costs of international 
negotiation… [they] incur the costs of negotiating between themselves to reach 
common policy stances”.  
At their core, the arguments relating to the problematic nature of coalitions 
amount to the assertion that it is often difficult for these groups to agree a common 
negotiating position. The process of intra-coalition negotiation, and the need to satisfy 
even only a comparatively small number of coalition members, means that any 
consensus reached often leaves very little room for flexibility. Such a straitjacketed 
position is not conducive to subsequent multilateral negotiation, which itself is 
premised on give and take. The necessary renegotiation of intra-coalition positions in 
response to the broader multilateral bargaining process would again be a difficult and 
time-consuming task, complicated by intra-group rivalries and the possibility of 
defection to rival coalitions. Much therefore depends on the nature of the coalition 
itself, with a key feature being the extent to which it is able to promote unity among 
its members. 
  While constituting natural coalitions, common positions have been notoriously 
difficult to achieve even for regional groupings at a relatively advanced stage of 
integration. The EU, for example, has frequently been the subject of denunciations for 
its inability to coalesce around issues on which it was expected to present a united 
front
32 Much of the difficulty that has been experienced by regional organisations in 
this respect is attributable to the problem of reconciling an often diverse array of 
viewpoints using the cooperative machinery available. To assume that developing 
countries within a newly minted RIA will be able to overcome this hurdle when their 
more established predecessors cannot seems, therefore, to be an unsustainable leap of 
faith.
33 It is clear that this weakness in intraregional cooperation will have a 
significant impact on the utility of the regional framework as a basis for dialogue with 
third parties. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
and, at times, between the major actors and what they term the more ‘antagonistic’ developing 
countries. 
32 Thus producing what is now commonly termed a capability-expectations gap (Hill, 1993). 
33 Many developing countries possess a further disadvantage not faced by their developed counterparts: 
inadequate state machinery. Speaking particularly of LDCs, Sideri (2000, pp.32-33) notes that their 
state machinery may not be able to provide necessary backing for regional cooperation to be 
successful.   17
DEVELOPMENTAL INTERREGIONALISM? 
What is interesting about the benefits outlined above is the way in which they may be 
affected by the dialogue structure in which the ACP sub-groups are engaged with the 
European Union. In the case of the EU’s developmental regionalism, this is 
undertaken within the context of interregionalism. The result is that we are seeing the 
fusion of a specific regional development focus with many of the roles and functions 
of interregionalism – an interregionalism which is increasingly conceived as 
constituting a specific functional layer in the architecture of global governance.  
Since Rüland (1999) first embarked upon a functional analysis of the place of 
interregionalism in global governance, an array of functions for this level have been 
elucidated and expanded upon. Very briefly, five roles and functions of 
interregionalism are generally recognised (see Figure 1 for further disaggregation of 
the functions). These are: 
1.  Balancing: based on a realist conception of actor competition, this involves the 
balancing (self-focused and externalised) of region against region, to maintain 
equilibrium in the international system; 
2.  Institution Building: the creation of norms and institutions both intra-
regionally (i.e. region-building) and interregionally; 
3.  Rationalising: interregional dialogues as potential clearing house for global 
multilateral for a; 
4.  Agenda Setting: related to Rationalising, but involving the setting of collective 
agendas at the interregional level for expression in global negotiations; 
5.  Collective Identity Formation: interregionalism contributes to the formation of 
regional identities, providing a solid foundation for regional integration, and 
for the emergence of regional security communities. 
Importantly, as Doidge (2004a, 2004b, 2007) has demonstrated, these roles and 
functions are affected in their performance by the specific constellation of regional 
actors involved. It matters, in other words, whether we are talking about a dialogue 
between strong regional actors, weak regional actors, or a combination of the two. 
This recognition has allowed the disaggregation of interregionalism into two 
functional varieties: (i) an internally focused, capacity building interregionalism; and 
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FIGURE 1: DETAILED ROLES/FUNCTIONS OF INTER- AND TRANSREGIONAL DIALOGUES 
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it is this type 1 capacity building interregionalism which most clearly demonstrates a 
synergy with developmental regionalism. 
  Capacity building interregionalism involves the gradual strengthening over 
time of a weaker regional integration arrangement through involvement with a strong 
interregional counterpart. What has been demonstrated in cases where a distinct 
asymmetry in strength of actorness exists within an interregional dialogue, is that 
specific roles and functions of interregionalism are more likely to be performed than 
others. These include: 
1.  Intra-regional institution building: whereby weaker regional actors are 
effectively forced to cooperate more closely in order to engage more fully with 
their interregional dialogue partner (Doidge, 2004a; 2007, p.239) – in other 
words, an integrative response among the weaker of the two counterparts; 
2.  Collective identity formation: whereby the process of interaction with a 
common external ‘other’ at the interregional level leads to a reinforcement of 
identities at the regional level (Gilson, 2001, 2002, 2005; Doidge, 2004a, 
2007). 
Both of these elements offer clear synergies with the developmental interregionalism 
currently being utilised by the EU.  
The fostering of regional integration and regional institutions is specified 
directly in the Cotonou Agreement, and in individual strategy documents. What is 
significant is the overlap with the perceived economic benefits of developmental 
interregionalism. An essential component of regional economic integration, the 
component that is necessary if the benefits of economic scale, trade creation and the 
attraction of FDI are to occur, is the establishment of strong regional institutions. 
Indeed, the failure of ‘old’ regionalism as a development strategy for the South as a 
result of a lack of solidarity among Member States has already been recognised. But it 
is precisely these structures of solidarity, coordination and cooperation that capacity 
building interregionalism has been demonstrated to develop, a process that has been 
explored in considerable detail in relation to the EU-ASEAN dialogue and the ASEM 
process. Indeed, the generally  accepted view of the ASEM process is that “[i]n face 
of the well established coordination machinery of the EU, the Asian countries were 
almost forced to engage in some sort of regional coordination in order to alleviate the 
sharp asymmetry in internal organisation between the two regions” (Hänggi, 2003, 
pp.211-212).   20
  Clearly, the formation of collective identities at the regional level reinforces 
this process of intra-regional institution building, but it also contributes to another of 
the perceived benefits of development interregionalism – that of securitisation. 
Regional securitisation as a function of trade relations has already been discussed, and 
criticised for constituting too narrow an understanding of the effect of regionalism on 
security. A far more nuanced approach to securitisation through regionalisation may 
be found in the concept of the security community, defined in the Deutschian 
tradition. Intrinsic to this is a notion of identity; indeed Deutsch (1988, p.271) viewed 
the creation of security communities as an exercise in identity building. Clearly, intra-
regional trade flows constitute only one strand in this process. 
Drawing heavily on constructivist literature, identity is understood as being 
constructed through inter-subjective interaction within a structure of collective 
meaning. It is, in other words, endogenous to interaction. In this way, the level of 
interaction present within a region is essential to the formation of collective identities. 
Thus it can be assumed that the thicker the structures of interaction,
34 and the broader 
their scope, the greater the chance of endogenous identity modification occurring. It is 
here that the earlier comment that intra-regional trade flows constitute only one strand 
in the process may again be raised. If collective identification, and thus securitisation, 
is to occur, the key is to encourage the process of inter-subjective interaction across as 
broad an array of issues as possible, something that the expansive process of 
interregionalism favoured by the EU tends to deliver.  
But interregionalism further contributes to this process of identity formation 
beyond providing an expansive arena for engagement. By confronting a 
comparatively weaker regional organisation with a coherent external ‘other’ with a 
strong identity, such as the EU, the process of interregionalism encourages the 
responsive formation of collective identity through what Zimmerling (1991) refers to 
as positive and negative external cogency. This has been explored in considerable 
detail by Gilson in relation to the ASEM process, on which she makes the comment 
                                                 
34 A number of structural and systemic factors are highlighted as being influential of collective identity 
formation. The first is the level of ‘slack’ in the system allowing space for collective identities to 
develop. The second factor of importance is rising interdependence, which has an effect in two ways. 
The first is an increase in the dynamic density of interaction as a result of, for example, trade flows 
(Wendt, 1994, p.389). The second is the emergence or existence of a common ‘other’, either 
personified in another actor – “denigrated, feared or emulated” (Ruggie, 1998, p.873) – or as a newly 
arising or crisis situation. “As interdependence rises”, in the words of Wendt (1994, pp.388-389), “so 
will the potential for endogenous transformations of identity”.   21
that “Asia acts as Asia for the purpose of engaging with the EU, and in the process of 
that interaction is responded to as though its interlocutor is responding to ‘Asia’, 
thereby reinforcing a sense of communal identity among a group not previously 
constituted for any other purpose” (Gilson, 2002, p.24). In this respect, therefore, 
interregionalism provides positive reinforcement for the processes leading to 
increased regional securitisation that are seen as a benefit of a developmental 
regionalist approach. 
Finally, if the creation of intra-regional institutions, and the formation of 
collective identities progresses sufficiently, the regional organisations in question will 
find it far simpler to engage in the sort of interest aggregation and collective 
bargaining outlined above as the second perceived non-economic benefit of 
interregionalism. 
The point being, that a developmental regionalist approach such as that being 
pursued by the EU, nested within interregionalism, may demonstrate positive 
synergies which, it can be hoped, will contribute to an overall positive result. 
However, as with interregionalism in general, in order for the best to be gained, it is 
necessary to recognise what is achievable, and what unachievable given the structures 
of the regional organisations involved. This recognition seems, unfortunately, to be 
lacking in the EU’s strategy towards the ACP states, in much the same way that it is 
lacking in its broader array of interregional relationships. 
What we see in the EU’s interregionalist approach to developmental 
regionalism is a highlighting of aspects of the globally active variety of 
interregionalism briefly raised above. The globally active variety of interregionalism 
is “concerned with the expression of interregional cooperation on the global stage” 
(Doidge, 2007, pp.242-243). It incorporates the high-end functions of 
interregionalism such as: 
1.  Alliance style balancing: the use of interregional relationships as a means for 
keeping other players in the system ‘honest’; 
2.  Rationalising: (see above); 
3.  Agenda setting: (see above). 
It is the rationalising and agenda setting functions that appear most clearly in the EU’s 
approach to developmental regionalism. Indeed, Chapter 4 of the Cotonou Agreement 
is dedicated to these functions, specifying the agreement of the signatories “to 
cooperate closely in identifying and furthering their common interests in international   22
economic and trade cooperation in particular in the WTO” (Art.39(2)). Such 
commitments on the need to cooperate in global fora are also to be found in the 
strategy documents on EU relations with the Pacific Islands and the Caribbean. 
However, what is significant about the globally active variety of 
interregionalism, is the requirement that the regional organisations engaged 
demonstrate a high level of actorness in order that the functions associated with this 
form of interregionalism be performed (Doidge, 2004b, 2007). The weak regional 
structures that are characteristic of the ACP sub-groups towards which the EU is 
targeting its developmental regionalist approach simply do not reach the required 
threshold. The risk of this is that we see the emergence of an interregional capability-
expectations gap a la Hill (1993), as the relationship fails to deliver the sort of 
cooperation at the global level that is envisaged. Whether such a failure to deliver the 
high-end functions of interregional cooperation discourages the EU, and has a 
subsequent detrimental effect on the low-end capacity building functions that are 
more clearly linked to developmental regionalism, only time can tell. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has explored the concept of developmental regionalism, charting its 
emergence in its ‘old’ formed linked with the Structuralist and Dependency views of 
underdevelopment, and following its transition to a ‘new’ form associated with the 
Neoliberal counter-revolution in development. In this latter respect, it went on to 
consider the specific benefits that are perceived to be gained if developing countries 
engage in some form of regional integration. Finally, the paper considered the place 
of the EU’s developmental regionalism with the interregional layer in the architecture 
of global governance. 
  The paper has recognised that interregionalism as a component of global 
governance, and specifically its capacity building variety, possesses certain synergies 
with developmental regionalism, and in this respect, the interregional context of the 
EU-ACP development relationship may serve to reinforce the regional development 
process. If this is to be the case, however, these synergies need to be recognised and 
acted upon. The Union needs to focus its interregional efforts on those aspects that 
will build the capacity of their dialogue partners in the ACP. In this way, the 
development model chosen may be positively reinforced. A focus on roles and   23
functions of interregionalism that are essentially beyond the capacity of their ACP 
partners would be to waste resources for little perceived benefit, and in a worst case 
scenario, such failures could breed discouragement. Such functions may, eventually, 
be performed as the intra-regional integration process within developing country 
groupings progresses, but to push them at the outset is a virtual recipe for failure. 
Importantly, in making such recognitions, this paper has begun the first 
tentative steps in the elaboration of a model of ‘developmental interregionalism’. A 
developmental interregionalism can be envisaged in which the regionalist model of 
development is premised upon the existence of interregional dialogue, thus both 
reinforcing the developmental process, but also situating it firmly within the broader 
architecture of global governance. By situating such developmental relationships 
within the broader system of governance, much may be done to overcome the sense of 





   24
REFERENCES 
 
Aluko, Olajide (1991) ‘The Foreign Policies of African States in the 1990s’, The 
Round Table, 80(317), pp.33-44. 
 
Andriamananjara, Soamiely; Schiff, Maurice (1998) Regional Groupings among 
Microstates. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.WPS1922. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
 
Archer, Clive (1992) International Organizations. London: Routledge. 
 
AU (2005) Declaration on the Review of the Millennium Declaration and the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Assembly/AU/Decl.1. Done in Sirte 
on 5
th July, 2005. Available online at: http://www.africa-union.org/summit/JULY 
%202005/Assembly%20Decisions%20-%20%2073-90%20Sirte%205th%20Session.pdf. 
Accessed on 7
th June 2007. 
 
Balasubramanyam, V. N.; Greenaway, David (1993) ‘Regional Integration 
Agreements and Foreign Direct Investment’, in Kym Anderson and Richard 
Blackhurst, eds., Regional Integration and the Global Trading System. Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
 
Baldwin, David A (1980) ‘Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis’, 
International Organization, 34(4), pp.471-506. 
 
Baran, Paul A. (1957) The Political Economy of Growth. New York: Monthly Review 
Press. 
 
Berthelon, Matías (2004) Growth Effects of Regional Integration Agreements. Central 
Bank of Chile Working Paper No.278. Agustinas: Central Bank of Chile. 
 
Bhagwati, Jagdish (1968) ‘Trade Liberalization Among LDCs, Trade Theory and 
GATT Rules’, in J.N. Wolfe, ed., Value, Capital and Growth: Papers in 
Honour of Sir John Hicks. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Bhagwati, Jagdish (1993) ‘Regionalism and multilateralism: an overview’, in Jaime 
de Melo and Arvind Panagariya, eds., New dimensions in regional integration. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Birdsall, Nancy; Rojas-Suarez, Liliana (2004) Financing Development: The Power of 
Regionalism. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development. 
 
Blomström, Magnus; Kokko, Ari (1997) Regional Integration and Foreign Direct 
Investment: A Conceptual Framework and Three Cases. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No.WPS1750. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
 
Bowles, Paul (2000) ‘Regionalism and Development after(?) the Global Financial 
Crises’, New Political Economy, 5(3), pp.433-455. 
   25
Casella, Alessandra (1996) ‘Large countries, small countries and the enlargement of 
trade blocs’, European Economic Review, 40(2), pp.389-415. 
 
Commission for Africa (2005) Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for 
Africa. London: Commission for Africa.  
 
Cooper, C.A.; Massell, B.F. (1965a) ‘A New Look at Customs Union Theory’, The 
Economic Journal, 75(300), pp.742-747. 
 
Cooper, C.A.; Massell, B.F. (1965b) ‘Towards a General Theory of Customs Unions 
for Developing Countries’, Journal of Political Economy, 73(5), pp.461-476. 
 
Cosbey, Aaron; Tay, Simon; Lim, Hank; Walls, Matthew (2004) The Rush to 
Regionalism: Sustainable Development and Regional/Bilateral Approaches to 
Trade and Investment Liberalization. Scoping Paper prepared for the 
International Development Research Centre, Canada. Winnipeg: International 
Institute for Sustainable Development. 
 
Council of the European Union (1992) ‘Council Regulation (EEC) No.443/92 of 25 
February 1992 on financial and technical assistance to, and economic 
cooperation with, the developing countries in Asia and Latin America’, 
Official Journal of the European Communities, L052, 27/02/1992, pp.1-6. 
 
de Melo, Jaime; Montenegro, Claudio; Panagariya, Arvind (1992) Regional 
Integration, Old and New. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
No.WPS985. Washington: World Bank. 
 
de Melo, Jaime; Panagariya, Arvind, eds., (1993) New Dimensions in Regional 
Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
DFID (2000) Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor. 
White Paper on International Development. London: Department for 
International Development. 
 
Deutsch, Karl (1988) The Analysis of International Relations. Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice Hall. 
 
Doidge, Mathew (2004a) “East is East…”: Inter- and Transregionalism and the EU-
ASEAN Relationship. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Canterbury. 
 
Doidge, Mathew (2004b) ‘Inter-regionalism and Regional Actors: The EU-ASEAN 
Example’, in Wim Stokhof, Paul van der Velde and Yeo Lay Hwee, eds., The 
Eurasian Space: Far More Than Two Continents. Singapore: ISEAS. 
 
Doidge, Mathew (2007) ‘Joined at the Hip: Regionalism and Interregionalism’, 
Journal of European Integration, 29(2), pp.229-248. 
 
Eichengreen, Barry; Frankel, Jeffrey A. (1995) ‘Economic Regionalism: Evidence 
from Two 20th Century Episodes’, North American Journal of Economics & 
Finance, 6(2), pp.89-106.   26
 
European Commission (1996) Green Paper on Relations between the European 
Union and the ACP Countries on the Eve of the 21
st Century: Challenges and 
Options for a New Partnership. COM (1996) 570. Brussels: European 
Commission. 
 
European Commission (2000) The European Community’s Development Policy. 
COM (2000) 212 final. Brussels: European Commission. 
 
Fawcett, Louise (1995) ‘Regionalism in Historical Perspective’, in Louise Fawcett 
and Andrew Hurrell, eds., Regionalism in World Politics: Regional 
Organization and International Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Fernández, Raquel (1997) Returns to Regionalism: An Evaluation of Nontraditional 
Gains from Regional Trade Agreements. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No.WPS1816. Washington: World Bank. 
 
Fernández, Raquel; Portes, Jonathan (1998) ‘Returns to Regionalism: An Analysis of 
Nontraditional Gains from Regional Trade Agreements’, World Bank 
Economic Review, 12(2), pp.197-220. 
 
Frank, André Gunder (1966) ‘The development of underdevelopment’, Monthly 
Review, 18(4), pp.17-31. 
 
Frank, André Gunder (1967) Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: 
Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
 
Frank, André Gunder (1969) Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution – 
Essays on the Development of Underdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy. 
London: Monthly Review Press. 
 
Ghatak, Subrata (2003) Introduction to Development Economics. London: Routledge. 
 
Gilpin, Robert (1981) War and Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Gilson, Julie (2001) ‘Europe-Asia: the Formal Politics of Mutual Definition’, in Peter 
W. Preston and Julie Gilson, eds., The European Union and East Asia: 
Interregional Linkages in a Changing Global System. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
 
Gilson, Julie (2002) Asia Meets Europe: Interregionalism and the Asia-Europe 
Meeting. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Gilson, Julie (2005) ‘New Regionalism? The EU and East Asia’, Journal of European 
Integration, 27(3), pp.307-326. 
 
Grynberg, Roman (1997) Towards a North-South Monologue: A Pacific Response to 
the Green Paper on Relations between the European Union and the ACP 
Countries. European Centre for Development Policy Management Working   27
Paper No.25. Maastricht: ECDPM. Available online at: 
http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/FileStruc.nsf/index.htm?ReadForm&C23
7C2F7E75BFF68C1256C8B0036E73C. Accessed on 7
th June, 2007. 
 
Hänggi, Heiner (1999) ‘ASEM and the Construction of the New Triad’, Journal of the 
Asia Pacific Economy, 4(1), pp.56-80. 
 
Hänggi, Heiner (2003) ‘Regionalism through interregionalism: East Asia and ASEM’, 
in Fu-Kuo Liu and Philippe Régnier, eds., Regionalism in East Asia: 
Paradigm Shifting? London: RoutledgeCurzon. 
 
Hettne, Björn (2000) ‘Development, Security and World Order: A Regionalist 
Approach’, in Shiela Page, ed., Regions and Development: Politics, Security 
and Economics. London: Frank Cass. 
 
Higgott, Richard A.; Cooper, Andrew Fenton (1990) ‘Middle power leadership and 
coalition building: Australia, the Cairns Group, and the Uruguay Round of 
trade negotiations’, International Organization, 44(4), pp.589-632. 
 
Hill, Christopher (1993) ‘The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing 
Europe’s International Role’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(3), 
pp.305-328. 
 
Hirschman, Albert O. (1945) National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
IMF (1994) World Economic Outlook. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary 
Fund.  
 
Johnson, Harry G. (1965) ‘An Economic Theory of Protectionism, Tariff Bargaining, 
and the Formation of Customs Unions’, Journal of Political Economy, 73(3), 
pp.256-283. 
 
Kahler, Miles (1992) ‘Multilateralism with small and large numbers’, International 
Organization, 46(3), pp.681-708. 
 
Keohane, Robert O.; Nye, Joseph S. (1977) Power and Interdependence: World 
Politics and Transition. Boston: Little Brown. 
 
Kiely, Ray (1998) ‘The crisis of global development’, in Ray Kiely and Phil Marfleet, 
eds., Globalisation and the Third World. London: Routledge. 
 
Lederman, Daniel; Maloney, William F.; Serven, Luis (2003) Lessons from NAFTA 
for Latin America and the Caribbean Countries: A Summary of Research 
Findings. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
 
Levy, Jack S. (1989) ‘The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence’, in 
Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern and Charles 
Tilly, eds., Behavior, Society and Nuclear War. New York: Oxford University 
Press.   28
 
Lewis, W. Arthur (1954) ‘Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour’, 
The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, 22(2), pp.139-191. 
 
Machlup, Fritz (1977) A History of Thought on Economic Integration. London: 
Macmillan. 
 
Mansfield, Edward D.; Pevehouse, Jon C. (2000) ‘Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and 
International Conflict’, International Organization, 54(4), pp.775-808. 
 
Mearsheimer, John J. (1990) ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold 
War’, International Security, 15(1), pp.5-56.  
 
NZAID (2003) Harnessing International Trade for Development. Wellington: New 
Zealand Agency for International Development. 
 
Obasanjo, Olesegun (1988) Africa Embattled: Selected Essays on Contemporary 
African Development. London: Fountain Publications. 
 
Oman , C., (1994) Globalization and Regionalisation: the Challenge for Developing 
Countries. Paris: OECD. 
 
Oxfam (2002) Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalisation and the 
Fight Against Poverty. Available online at: 




Pazos, Felipe (1973) ‘Regional integration of trade among developing countries’, 
World Development, 1(7), pp.1-12. 
 
Powers, Kathy L. (2003) Regional Trade Agreements as Security Institutions: 
Managing international conflict through integration in security & natural 
resources. European Consortium for Political Research Workshop Paper. 
Available online at: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/ 
edinburgh/ws9/Powers.pdf. Accessed on 7
th June, 2007. 
 
Rostow, W.W. (1960) The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ruggie, John Gerard (1998) ‘What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-
utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge’, International 
Organization, 47(1), pp.139-174. 
 
Rüland, Jürgen (1999) Transregional Relations: The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) – 
A Functional Analysis. Paper prepared for the International Conference on 
‘Asia and Europe on the Eve of the 21st Century’, held at Chulalongkorn 
University, Bangkok, 19
th-20
th August 1999. 
 
Rüland, Jürgen (2000) ‘Asia-Europe Cooperation – The ASEM Process: A European 
View’, in Magnus Jerneck and Ulrich Niemann, eds., Asia and Europe:   29
Regional Cooperation in a Globalising World – Lectures from the Third ASEF 
Summer School 2000. Singapore: ASEF. 
 
Rüland, Jürgen (2001) ASEAN and the European Union: A Bumpy Interregional 
Relationship. Bonn: Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität. 
 
Sideri, Sandro (2000) ‘Globalisation and Regional Integration’, in Shiela Page, ed., 
Regions and Development: Politics, Security and Economics. London: Frank 
Cass. 
 
Sunkel, Osvaldo. (2000) ‘Development and Region Integration in Latin America: 
Another Chance for an unfulfilled Promise?’, in Björn Hettne, András Inotai 
and Osvaldo Sunkel, eds., The New Regionalism and the Future of Security 
and Development. Houndmills: Macmillan. 
 
TFIPE (1984) The President’s Task Force on International Private Enterprise: 
Report to the President. Washington, D.C.: The Task Force. 
 
Touval, Saadia (1989) ‘Multilateral Negotiation: An Analytic Approach’, Negotiation 
Journal, 5(2), pp.159-173. 
 
Toye, John (1987) Dilemmas of Development: Reflections on the Counter-Revolution 
in Development Theory and Policy. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
UNDP (2003) Human Development Report 2003: Millennium Development Goals: A 
Compact Among Nations to End Human Poverty. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Wendt, Alexander (1994) ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’, 
American Political Science Review, 88(2), pp.384-396. 
 
Williamson, John (1990) ‘What Washington means by policy reform’, in John 
Williamson, ed., Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? 
Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics. 
 
World Bank (2000) Trade Blocs. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
World Bank (2001) World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty. 
Oxford: University Press. 
 
World Bank (2005a) Global Economic Prospects: Trade, Regionalism, and 
Development. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
 
World Bank (2005b) World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate 
for Everyone. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Zimmerling, Ruth (1991) Externe Einflüsse: Drei Annahmen aus der 
Integrationsliteratur, Ruth Zimmerling, Externe Einflüsse auf die Integration   30
von Staaten: Zur politikwissenschaftlichen Theorie regionaler 
Zusammenschlüsse. Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Karl Alber. 
 
 